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30 NOV. 45
NT_Vol-II.pdf =470 (475) - 472(477)
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Witness Lahousen, you have made definite replies to questions by Colonel Amen and I should like to have certain details. Am I to understand you rightly that the insurgent units of the Ukrainian nationalists were organized under the direction of the German High Command?
LAHOUSEN: They were Ukrainian immigrants from Galicia. GEN. RUDENKO: And from these immigrants were formed Commandos? LAHOUSEN: Yes. "Commando" perhaps is not quite the right expression. They were people who were brought together in camps
and were given a military or a semi-military training. GEN. RUDENKO: What was the function of these Commandos? LAHOUSEN: They weGe organizations of immigrants from the
Galicia Ukraine, as I already previously stated, who worked together with 'the Amt Ausland Abwehr. GEN. RUDENKO: What were these troops supposed actually to accomplish?
LAHOUSEN: Tasks were assigned to them before each combat by the office in charge of the command, that is, in the case of orders originating from the office to which I belonged, they were determined by the OKW.
GEN. RUDENKO: What functions did these groups have?
LAHOUSEN: These Commandos were to carry out sabotage of all kinds behind the enemy's front line. GEN. RUDENKO: That is to say in what territory? LAHOUSEN: In those territories with which Germany had
entered into war, or speaking of the concrete case here in question, with Poland, or to be more correct in Poland.
GEN. RUDENKO: Of course in Poland. Well, sabotage and what else?
LAHOUSEN: Sabotage, such as wrecking of bridges and other objectives of military importance. The Wehrmacht operational staff determined what was of military importance; details of that activity I have just described, namely, destruction of militarily important objectives or objectives important for a particular operation.
GEN. RUDENKO: But what about terroristic activities? I am asking you about the terroristic activities of these units.
LAHOUSEN: Political tasks were not assigned to them by us, that is, by the Amt Ausland Abwehr. Political assignments were made by the respective Reich offices responsible, where it should be said, often as a result of erroneous. . .
GEN. RUDENKO: You have misunderstood me. You are speaking about ,sabotage and I was asking you concerning terroristic acts of these organizations. Do you understand me? Was terror one of their tasks? Let me repeat again, as well as the sabotage acts, were there any terror acts assigned to them?
LAHOUSEN: On our part never. GEN. RUDENKO: You have told me that from your side there was no question of terrorism; from whose side was the question put, who worked on this aspect? LAHOUSEN: Well, that was the whole point all the time. Each one of. these military Abwehr units was asked again and again to combine our purely 'military tasks which were determined by the needs of the Wehrmacht leadership with political or terroristic measures, as is clearly shown by the memorandum on our files concerning preparation of the campaign against Poland. GEN. RUDENKO: Answering the question of Colonel Amen as to whether the Red Army man was looked upon as an ideological enemy and was subjected to corresponding measures, what do you mean by corresponding measures? I repeat the question. You have said that the Red Army man was looked upon by you, I mean by the German High Command as an ideological enemy and was to be subjected to corresponding measures. What does it mean? What do you mean by saying corresponding measures? LAHOUSEN: By special measures I mean quite clearly all those brutal methods which were actually used and which I have already mentioned and of which I am convinced there were many more, more than I could possibly have seen in my restricted field and more than was known to me. GEN. RUDENKO: You already told the Tribunal that there were special Commandos for the screening of prisoners of war. I understand
that they were screened in th'e following w'ay: Into those who were to be killed. and the others who were to be interned in camps, is that right? LAHOUSEN: Yes, these special Commandos of the SD were concerned, however, solely with the execution of those selected amongst the prisoners of war. GEN. RUDENKO: That of course makes the chief of the cornmandos
responsible and decisive for the question as to who was to die and who was not to die. LAHOUSEN: Yes, in the course of a discussion with Reinecke, the question was raised whether to give to the head of one such Commando unit the right to decide who, in view of the order, was to be looked upon as Bolshevistically tainted or not.
GEN. RUDENKO: And the chief of the Commando unit decided upon his own authority, what to do with them.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, at least up to the date of the discussion in which I participated, upon an order from Canaris. This point was one of the most important ones of this discussion.
GEN. RUDENKO: You have tol'd us about your protest and the protest of Canaris against these atrocities, killings, and so forth. What were the results of these protests?
LAHOUSEN: As I have already stated, there were some very modest results, so modest that. you can hardiy call them results at all. For the fact that executions were not to take place in sight of the troops but only at a distance of 500 meters can in no way be called a good result.
GEN. RUDENKO: What conversation did you have with Muller on this subject, concerning concessions he had made? You told us when you were asked by General Alexandrov.. . .
LAHQUSEN: Who was Alexandrov? GEN. RUDENKO: You were questioned by Colonel Rosenblith, a representative of the Soviet Delegation. I am sorry I made a mistake. Perhaps you will remember your communication to Colonel Rosenblith regarding the conversation and the concessions that Muller made. I shall ask you to tell us that part again. LAHOUSEN: The name of Alexandrov does not mean anything to me. What has the name Alexandrov to do in this connection? GEN. RUDENKO: Alexandrov was a mistake on my part. Forget it. I am interested in the question of Muller, concerning the shootings, torturings, and so forth. LAHOUSEN: I had a long conversation with Muller, especially with regard to making the selections. I cited, to be concrete, as an example of the methods used, the case of the Crimean Tartars, Soviet Russian soldiers who, according to their nationality, origi- nated from the Crimea; and cases where, for certain reasons,,Moham- medan people were declared Jews, and were then executed. Thus, aside from the brutality of these and all other similar measures, this proved the entirely irrational point of view, incomprehensible to any normal person, which characterized the handling of the entire matte;. To that, among other things, I made reference. GEN. RUDENKO: You told us how these measures were carried out. , THE PRESIDENT: He doesn't hear you, carry on but go a little bit more slowly. GEN. RUDENKO: Have you finished your report concerning the conversation with Muller?
30 NOV. 45
NT_Vol-II.pdf =478 (483)
LAHOUSEN: I would like to achieve clarity relative to what the General has in mind. Am I being asked about the conference in the Fuhrer's train in 1939 prior to the fall of Warsaw? According to the entries in Canaris' diary, it took place on 12 September 1939. This order or directive which Ribbentrop issued and which Keitel transmitted to Canaris, Ribbentrop also giving it to Canaris during a brief discussion, was in reference to the organizations of National Ukrainians with which Amt Abwehr cooperated along military lines, and which were to bring about an uprising in Poland, an uprising which aimed to exterminate the Poles and the Jews; that is to say, above all, such elements as were always being discussed in these conferences. When Poles are mentioned, the intelligentsia especially are meant, and all those persons who embodied the national will of resistance. This was the order given to Canaris in the connection I have already described and as ~t has already been noted in the memorandum. The idea was not to kill Ukrainians but, on the contrary, to carry out this task of a purely political and terroristic nature together with the Ukrainians. The cooperation between Amt Ausland Abwehr and these people who numbered only about 500 or 1000, and what actually occured c'an be clearly seen from the diary. This was simply a preparation for military sabotage.
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): These instructions were received from Ribbentrop and Keitel?
LAHOUSEN: They came from Ribbentrop, Such orders which concerned political aims couldn't possibly come from Amt Ausland Abwehr because any.. .
THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not asking you whether they could or could not. I am asking you where they came from. LAHOUSEN: They came from Ribbentrop, as is seen from the memorandum. This is the memorandum that I made for Canaris. DR. DIX: I have three short questions. May I put them?
THE PRESIDENT: It is now past 4, and we have to hear the requests of the Defendant Hess, and the Court has to be cleared for them. So I think you had better postpone them until tomorrow.
!A recess was taken and all defendants except Hess were removed from the courtroom.]
THE PRESIDENT: I call upon counsel for the Defendant Hess. DR. GUNTHER VON ROHRSCHEIDT (Counsel for Defendant Hess): May it please the Tribunal, I am speaking as counsel for the
Defendant Rudolf Hess
11. Feb. 46
Here these points are clarified by the testimony of a former colonel of the German Army, Erwin Stolze, who was Lahousen's deputy in Department 11, Ausland Abwehr, attached to the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. Stolze was taken prisoner by the Red Army. I wish to submit to the Tribunal as evidence Stolze's testimony of 25 December 1945, which was given to Lieu- tenant Colonel Burashnikov, of the ~ounterintelkgence Service of the Red Army and which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-231 (Exhibit Number USSR-231), which I beg you to accept as evidence. I shall read into the record individual extracts from this testimony which are underlined in red pencil. I begin the quotation from Page 48 of the document book. Stolze testified as follows:
"I received instructions from Lahousen to organize and to lead a special group under code name 'A,' which had to engage in the preparation of diversionary acts and in the work of disintegration of the Soviet rear in connection with the intended attack on the U.F.S.R. "At the.same time, in order that I should become acquainted with it and for my guidance, Lahousen gave me an order which came from the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces and which contained basic directives for the conduct of sub- versive activities in the territory of the U.S.S.R. after Ger- many's attack on the Soviet Union. This order was signed by Field Marshal Keitel and initialed by General Jodl (or by General Warlimont on Keitel's instructions-I do not quite remember which.)"
I am omitting two lines which are'irrelevant to our case and read on: "It was pointed out in the order that for the purpose of delivering a lightning blow against the Soviet Union, Ab- wehr 11, in conducting subversive work against Russia, with the help of a net of V men, must use its agents for kindling national antagonism among the people of the Soviet Union." I now request you to turn over the page and on Page 49 in the
document book on Page 2 of the minutes of the interrogation, and
to note the following passages in his testimony: "In carrying out the above-mentioned instructions of Keitel and Jodl, I contacted Ukrainian National Socialists who were in the German Intelligence Service and other members of the nationalist fascist groups, whom I roped in to carry out the tasks as set out above. "In particular, instructions were given by me personally to the leaders of the Ukrainian Nationalists, Melnik (code name
'Consul 1') and Bandara, to organize immediately upon Ger-
many's attack on the Soviet Union, and to provoke demon-
strations in the Ukraine in order to disrupt the immediate
rear of the Soviet armies, and also to convince international
public opinion of alleged disintegration of the Soviet rear.
"We also prepared special diversionist groups by Abwehr I1
for subversive activities in the Baltic republics of the Soviet
I must again request you to turn over the page. On Page 50 in the document book, beginning with the third line from the top you will find Stolze's testimony:
"Apart from this, a special military unit was trained for sub- versive activities on Soviet territory, a special duty training regiment for special tasks, Brandenburg 800, under the imme- diate command of the head of Abwehr 11, Lahousen. Among the objects of this special unit, created in 1940, was the sei- zure of operationally important points, such as bridges, tun- nels, and important military installations, and holding them till the arrival of the advance units of the German Army. "Contrary to the international rules governing the conduct of .
war, the personnel of this regiment, mainly composed of Ger-
mans from beyond the border, made extensive use of enemy
uniforms and equipment in order to camouflage their opera-
"During the course of preparations for Germany's attack on
the U.S.S.R., the command of the Brandenburg Regiment also
collected supplies of Red Army uniforms, equipment, and
arms, and organized separate detachments of -Germans ac-
quainted with the Russian language."
Your Honors, the testimonies of Stoke, Bentivegni, and Piecken-
brock, which I have presented in evidence, disclose the working methods of the German Intelligence Service in the preparation and execution of Plan Barbarossa.
I shall not detain the Tribunal any further with these questions. But before proceeding to a further presentation, I should like to point out that the department of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner was likewise interested in intelligence work. I shall limit myself to submitting ene document which is typical of the manner in which the Hitlerites, by exploiting their connections, created difficulties in Iran, through which country, as was known, the supply routes passed for the delivery to. the U.S.S.R. of motor vehicles and war material of the most varied nature.
The document, which I intend to submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit
Number USSR-178 (Document Number USSR-178) was taken by us from the German Foreign Office archives, which fell into the
NT_Vol_XXXVIII.pdf, Blue - 279 (287)
SIXTH REPORT BY THE SO-CALLED "EINSATZGRUPPEN" IN THE
SOVIET UNION, 1 TO 31 OCTOBER 1941, ON THEIR ACTIVITIES AND
THE SITUATION: FIGHT AGAINST PARTISANS; MASS MURDERS
OF JEWS; SHOOTING OF COMMUNIST FUNCTIONARIES; SITUATION
IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND NORTHERN RUSSIA, IN WHITE
RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE; SPIRIT AND BEHAVIOR OF THE
POPULATION IN THE TWO LATTER TERRITORIES; VARIOUS DE-
TAILS, INCLUDING A REPORT ON THE GERMAN ETHNIC GROUP
IN THE AREA AROUND LANDAU, WHICH THROUGH ISOLATION
FROM GERMANY APPEARED TO BE VERY LITTLE INFLUENCED
BY NATIONAL SOCIALISM (EXHIBIT USA-470)
Verv I Geheirn-Stp rot I ,,42." im Ausfertigungs-Vrn Ti
Tatigkeits- und Lagebericht Nr. 6
der Einsatzgruppen der Sicher,heitspolizei
und des SD
in der UdSSR.
(Bezlichtszeit vom 1. -31.10.1941.)
a) Verhalten gegeniiber dern Deutschtum.
Obwohl die ukrainische Bevolkerung durchaus als deutsch-
freundlich angesehen werden kann, bewirkt doch das Fehlen
einer durchschlagenden deutschen Propaganda, daR die Eevolke-
rung z.T. falsche Vorstellungen uber deutsche Absichten hat.
Stark kritisiert wird z.B. die derzeitige deutsche Einstellung zu
den Kollektivwirtschaften und dern Lohnproblem.
Nachdem auch bekannt geworden ist, daB in Ostgalizien und
Wolhynien die Polen fur gewisse Verwaltungsaufgaben den
Ukrainern vorgezogen werden, hat sich cine leichte Verstimmung
In dern von den Rumanen besetzten Gebiet ist die Stimmung
einen Freund abriicken und in den Rumanen
einen Gegner in das Land kommen. Der Grund
hierfiir diirfte in dern unterschiedlichen Auftreten und Verhalten
der deutschen und rumanischen Truppen liegen. Man empfindet
in den Kreisen der Ukrainer, daD die Rumanen diesen Krieg als
nationalen Revanchekrieg gegen Russland fur die Anektierung
Bessarabiens und der Nordbukowina fuhren, wahrend man den
Krieg der Deutschen als ausschlieBLichen Befreiungskampf von
dern jiidischen Bolschewismus ansieht. D e r R u m a n e i s t
also der siegreiche
-Seite 29 -
Gegner, wahrend der Deutsche als Befreier
Auch weiterhin verhalt sich die ukrainische Bevolkerung dern
Plan einer selbstandigen Ukraine durchaus ablehnend gegenuber.
a- Die starkste Gruppe, die eine selbstandige Ukraine befur-
wortet, ist nach wie vor die Bandera-Gruppe, deren Anhanger
auBerordentlich aktiv sind und deren Fanatismus teils von per-
sonlichen Grunden und teils von tiefem Nationalgefuhl getragen
Die Anhanger Banderas wurden bei Beginn des Feldzuges in
Lemberg und Sanok in kleinen Gruppen zusammengefafit und
erhielten eine kurze Schulung. Sie wurden weiterhin mit Geld
und Propagandamaterial Gersehen. Unter dem Deckmantel der
Durchfuhrung von Ordnungsaufgaben, wie Einsetzung von Biir-
germeistern, Einrichtung von Miliz und Kampf gegen Juden und
Kommunisten, wurde politische Arbeit geleistet.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1365-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 487
LETTER FROM SCHICKEDANZ, STAFF LEADER OF THE FOREIGN PO
LITICAL OFFICE OF THE NAZI PARTY, TO DEFENDANT LAMMERS,
IS JUNE 1939, TRANSMITTING "THE PLAN FOR THE EAST"l
15 June 1939
To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery,
Dr. Hans Heinrich Lammers
Berlin W 8, Voss Strasse No.6
Dear Minister Lammers:
Western White-Ruthenia and the Western Ukraine.
After the Carpatho-Ukraine was ceded to Hungary, the entire
Ukrainian public opinion, which at first had entirely unfounded
hopes for a specific German interest in that territory, became
openly hostile. In a very adroit way this attitude is being en
couraged by Poland, Great Britain and France. Ukrainian pub
lic opinion feels that they were somehow cheated in their vague
expectations without having any real reasons for that attitude.
However, a Ukrainian organization (the OUN, Le., the Organiza
tion of Ukrainian Nationalists), which has been prepared [aus
gerichtet] by the High Command of the Wehrmacht to deal with
special tasks, has contributed greatly to creating such an attitude.
That organization, in public statements and in its press releases,
which were published in Germany, demanded national independ
ence of the Carpatho-Ukraine, although it had been deprived of
its life centers and although the possibility of an autarchic exist
ence [Selbsterhaltungsmoeglichkeit] of that dismembered terri
tory could only have been guaranteed by a complete economic
union with the Reich at that time.
Representatives of that organization played a fateful role in
the Ukraine with respect to the creation of incidents with the
Czech and Polish agencies and they also exerted constant pressure
upon the self-administration of the country, always referring to
the German military power which was backing them up, as well
as to the fact that they had received a certain authorization from
Greater Germany. The Viennese radio transmissions in the
Ukrainian language also followed that general tendency. All this,
of course, is well known by the entire Ukrainian public and is the
partial cause of their disappointment, which is directed in a par
ticularly outspoken degree against the OUN. That organization,
which can be best compared with the Croat Ustashi group, is
probably still appointed by the High Command of the Wehrmacht
to carry out certain intelligence tasks in the Western Ukraine in
case of a conflict with Poland. It may be suited to that purpose
but it is entirely unfit for leading a political operation which
should seize hold of the population.
Berlin, 14 June 1939